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Ndreu: United States v. U.S. District Court

CASE SUMMARY
NONCONSENSUAL WAIVER OF A
JURY TRIAL: CLOSING THE DOOR,
BUT NOT COMPLETELY
UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT
INTRODUCTION

In United States v. United States District Court, the Ninth Circuit
held that the circumstances of a child sexual abuse case did not warrant
an exception to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which requires the government's consent for a defendant to waive a jury
trial.) The court determined that the district court's ruling, which
allowed the defendant to waive a jury trial without the government's
consent, was clearly erroneous as a matter of law, and granted the
government's petition for a writ of mandamus to require the district court
to hold a jury trial. 2
I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 19, 2003, the United States charged Allen Harrod, his
wife, and another married couple with multiple counts arising from the
transport of young children in interstate commerce with the purpose of

I

United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Cal., 464 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir.

2006).
2 [d.

at 1072.
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engaging them in illegal sexual acts. 3 The victims, defendants' own five
children, allegedly suffered ritualistic sexual abuse for approximately ten
years, including "oral copulation, vaginal and anal intercourse, and other
acts committed upon the children, and acts that the children were forced
to commit.,,4 Some of the children were as young as age seven when
abused. 5 Defense counsel indicated that they would not contest either
that the sexual acts had occurred or that the children were transported
between states. 6 The defense planned to focus instead on lack of intent. 7
On April 14, 2006, eleven days prior to the date set for trial, Harrod
filed a "'Motion to Waive Jury and to be Tried by Judge. ",8 The basis of
the motion was that due to the horrific nature of the molestation
evidence, "no jury could fairly consider defendants' argument that the
government could not prove knowledge and intent at the time the
children were transported in interstate commerce.,,9 The government
opposed the motion. to
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California held a hearing on defendants' motion for a bench trial on April
19, 2006. 11 Over the government's objections, the district court granted
the motion. 12 The court noted that according to defendants' counsel, the
only defense with any chance of success would be one based on lack of
knowledge or intent, and stated that it would be "'very difficult for the
court to control the evidence in such a way that the jury is going to be
able to focus upon that defense. ", 13 The court further stated that it could
'" gi ve both sides a fair trial, if [it was] a court trial, ", but said that the
bottom line was that the court '" [did] not know [whether it could] rule
correctly on everyone of the evidentiary objections that might be
deemed to deny defendants a fair trial if [there was] a jury [trial].",14

Id. at 1067.
1d.
5 1d.
6 1d.
7 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Cal., 464 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir.
3
4

2006).
8 1d.
9

!d.

!d. The government's opposition was predicated on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
23(a), which requires the consent of the government for a defendant to waive a jury trial. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 23(a). See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
II United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Cal., 464 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir.
2006).
12
1d.
10

13
14

1d. (quoting the district court).
1d. at 1068 (quoting the district court).
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The district court cited Singer v. United States and asserted "'the
likelihood that the defendants would not receive a fair trial to a jury
outweighs any interest that the Government has under Rule 23 to a trial
by jury.",15 Following its grant of defendants' motion, the district court
stayed the case to allow the government to file its mandamus petition. 16
II.

NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS

In a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
began by articulating its five-factor test to determine whether to grant
"the exceptional remedy of mandamus relief' and stated that "[a]
petitioner need not establish all five ... factors.,,17 One of the factors the
Ninth Circuit evaluates in its determination is "'whether the district
court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law. ",18
The Ninth Circuit then reviewed the history of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 23(a) ("Rule 23(a)") and the United States Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Singer, which addressed the
constitutionality of that rule. 19 Rule 23(a) was adopted in 1944 to codify
the Supreme Court's 1930 holding in Patton v. United States. 20 Rule
23(a) requires the consent of the government and the approval of the
court in order for a defendant to waive a jury trial in a federal case. 21 In
Singer, the Court held that conditioning a defendant's waiver on the
consent of the government did not violate the defendant's due process
and fair trial rights. 22

1d. (quoting the district court); see Singer v. United States 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
1d.
17 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Cal., 464 F.3d 1065, 1068-69 (9th Cir.
2006) (citing United States v. Fei Ye,436 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2006)).
ISld. at 1069 (quoting Fei Ye, 436 F.3d at 1121-22). The complete five-factor test is as
follows:
15

16

(1) whether the petitioner has no other adequate means to attain the relief he or she desires;
(2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on
appeal; (3) whether the district court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4)
whether the district court's order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent disregard
of the federal rules; and (5) whether the district court's order raises new and important
problems, or issues of law of first impression.
Id. (quoting Fei Ye, 436 F.3d at 1121-22).
19 See id. at 1069-70; see also Singer v. United States 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
20 ld. at 1069. The text of Rule 23(a) reads as follows: "Jury Trial. If the defendant is
entitled to a jury trial, the trial must be by jury unless: (I) the defendant waives a jury trial in
writing; (2) the government consents; and (3) the court approves." Id.
21 FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a).
22 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Cal., 464 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir.
2006) (citing Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965)).
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The Ninth Circuit noted that the Singer Court had remarked it
"'need not determine ... whether there might be some circumstances
where a defendant's reasons for wanting to be tried by a judge alone are
so compelling that the Government's insistence on trial by jury would
result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial. ",23 The Ninth
Circuit then examined case law after Singer and pointed out that the
Supreme Court had never determined the circumstances alluded to in
Singer to exist; to the contrary, the Court had on at least one occasion
"characterized the requirement of government consent as absolute.,,24
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that lower federal courts had
generally assumed that Singer provides for a possible exception to the
government consent requirement. However, the court noted that the two
district court cases cited by the defendant that granted a waiver over the
government's objection were from the 1970's, and observed that no
circuit court that had considered the question had approved such a
nonconsensual waiver. 25 The court also pointed to the Ninth Circuit case
of United States v. Reyes, where it had stated that any "'passion,
prejudice . . . and public feeling'" defendant feared from the jury was
addressed during the voir dire proceedings, and upheld the trial court's
refusal to grant defendant's nonconsensual waiver. 26
Moving on to the district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that "'a mistake ha[d] been committed. ",27 The court found
that "the district court, as a matter of law, was clearly erroneous in
ordering a non-jury trial without the consent of the prosecution.,,28 The
court noted that "while trying this case [wa]s not without its challenges,"
the court was confident that the trial judge was "fully capable of ensuring
the[] defendants an impartial trial. ,,29 The court observed that the trial
court had an abundance of tools at its disposal, derived from the Federal
Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure and the court's inherent

ld. (quoting Singer, 380 U.S. at 37).
ld. (citing Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979)).
25 ld. at 1070-71 (citations omitted).
26 ld. at 1071 (quoting United States v. Reyes, 8 F.3d 1379, 1390 (9th Cir. 1993)). One
commentator has suggested that any possibility of a Singer exception based on fear of an impartial
jury trial is illusory: "[Sjince a defendant has an absolute right to a trial by an impartial jury, any
defendant who makes such a demonstration is entitled to a dismissal, thereby rendering any right to a
bench trial grounded in the fair trial guarantee superfluous." Jon Fieldman, Comment, Singer v.
United States and the Misapprehended Source of the Nonconsensual Bench Trial, 51 U. CHI. L. REv.
222,223 (1984).
27 United States v. U.S. Dis!. Court for the E. Dis!. of Cal., 464 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir.
2006) (quoting United States v. Fei Ye, 436 F.3d 1117. 1123 (9th Cir. 2006)).
28 ld. at 1072.
29 ld. at 1071.
23

24
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power, to ensure an impartial trial. 3o
The Ninth Circuit then returned to its discussion of the five-factor
mandamus test, and found that in addition to the clearly erroneous factor,
two other factors were met: the government had no other adequate means
to force the district court to hold a jury trial, and this error was not
correctable on appeal. 31 The court also mentioned that the issue of
government consent "raise[d] an important question of law," thereby
satisfying an additional mandamus factor. 32 The court accordingly
granted the government's petition for a writ of mandamus, and directed
the district court to rescind its order granting defendant's jury trial
waiver motion. 33

m.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION

The Ninth Circuit's decision in this case affirms the jurisprudence
of other circuit courts. 34 This will likely make it harder for defendants in
federal criminal trials to obtain a nonconsensual jury trial waiver,
particularly in the Ninth Circuit. The underlying case here involved
particularly heinous crimes, committed against children. 35 It is difficult
to imagine a case with more potential for jury '''passion, prejudice[, or]
public feeling",36 to render an impartial jury trial impossible; this raises
the bar for defendants attempting to show impartiality such that a
nonconsensual waiver is warranted. 37
The Ninth Circuit appears to have left the door open, however. In
commenting on the Singer Court's observation that it did not need to
determine in that case whether a nonconsensual waiver might under
some circumstances be warranted, the Ninth Circuit stated that, "Neither
need we make such a determination. ,,38 This statement might keep hope
30 1d. The court listed several examples of such tools, including voir dire, limitations of
cumulative and "bad acts" evidence, and jury instructions emphasizing that each and every element
of the charged offense must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1071-72.
3 J Id. at 1072.
32 United States v. U.S. Dis!. Court for the E. Dis!. of Cal., 464 F.3d 1065, 1072 (9th Cir.
2006).
33 /d.
34 See id. at 1070-71 (citing decisions of other circuit courts and noting that those circuit
courts that had considered the issue had "uniformly upheld trial courts' refusals to grant such
waivers without government consent.") (citations omitted).
35 1d. at 1067.

Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 37-38 (1965) (quoting petitioner's briefat 24).
One commentator asserts that such an exception for impartiality would be superfluous.
See Fieldman, supra note 26, at 223.
38 United States v. U.S. Dis!. Court for the E. Dis!. of Cal., 464 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir.
2006).
36

37
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alive for defendants, wishing to obtain a nonconsensual bench trial, that
their circumstances could merit a Singer exception.

DUENDREU'
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